Multilateral Trade Negotiations Hang in the Balance

Yesterday was the final day for Seoul and Washington D.C. to seal South Korea’s biggest trade pact ever and the United States’ biggest trade pact in over 15 years (since the 1992 North American Free Trade Agreement). Both President Bush and his South Korean counterpart, Roh Moo-hyun, were under pressure to meet the March 31^st deadline, so that they would be able to take advantage of Bush’s trade promotion authority (TPA) before it expires on June 30^th. According to the TPA - which gives the White House the power to negotiate trade deals independent of Congress - the administration must notify Congress of its intent to sign any new pacts 90 days in advance (note: March 31^st is exactly 90 days before June 30^th).

Of the various interesting facets of this situation, I find it most intriguing to observe all the demands that the White House has to balance in order to push this pact through. On one hand, the new majority in the Senate threatens to vote no if the deal does not secure greater access to heavily protected Korean goods such as rice and cars. For although the TPA does loosen the chains to Congress that weigh the Executive down (Congress cannot amend or filibuster the agreement), the White House must still bend to the Democrats’ demands in order to secure the up-down congressional vote. On the other hand, Korea is demanding that Washington loosen the environmental protections in the pact, saying that its anti-dumping laws are unfair. Finally (in a display of balancing skill that could rival Chinese plate spinning), the White House also needs to appease big businesses such as Chevron, who argue that the concessions, “could water down investment protections and leave US companies vulnerable.”

Multilateral deals like this one would be impossible without the TPA. This tool gives the executive the go-ahead to bypass the “bureaucratic quagmire,” of Congress and make trade negotiations an actual possibility. Both Neustadt and Howell would be proud, for in this situation, the president must act as a clerk and persuade foreign powers, interest groups, and the Congress that what he wants is best, but at the same time, the president has the substantial power to fast-track foreign policy through to completion.